Australian Government
National Emergency Management Agency

Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning (CASP) **Guidebook**

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Acknowledgment of Country

In the spirit of reconciliation, NEMA acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Country throughout Australia and their connections to land, sea and the community. We pay our respects to their Elders past and present and extend that respect to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples today.

Version Details

Version #	Date of Issue	Brief description of change
1.0	May 2024	Establishment of version control
1.2	July 2024	Terminology update. CASP template update. Completed CASP update.
1.3	August 2024	Addition of ‘A new Paradigm’ on page 9. Review of wording and grammar across Guidebook.

Contents

A catastrophic disaster is what is beyond our current arrangements, thinking, experience and imagination (i.e. that has overwhelmed our technical, non-technical and social systems and resources, and has degraded or disabled governance structures and strategic and operational decision-making functions).

– Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework 2019

Foreword

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), is Australia's National Disaster Management Organisation. NEMA delivers programs, policies and services that strengthen the national security and emergency management capability of Australia. NEMA coordinates the Australian Government's physical and financial support following emergencies and disasters in collaboration with state and territory governments, which manage emergency responses within their jurisdiction.

Given the increased complexity, intensity and frequency of disasters and crises in Australia, NEMA has developed a repeatable strategic planning tool to make sense of complex issues related to crises and disasters using a national perspective.

The Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning (CASP) employs a structured, systematic methodology to analyse complex scenarios and is the Australian Governments preferred planning tool in line with the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF). CASP is a set of tools that allows timely integration of information from multiple sources and the exploration of how government, not-for-profit and private sector efforts can integrate to provide a unified response.

CASP was developed using a research process that generated solutions to practical problems and empowered practitioners to develop and test the tool. CASP draws on approaches used by the military, human-design thinking and the Australasian Integrated Inter-services Management Systems (AIIMS)[1]. The process has been tested and refined using real-world disaster and crisis management responses.

This guide is an introduction and overview of the CASP methodology. It provides a detailed illustration of the purpose, inputs, outputs and outcomes for each phase.

Joe Buffone
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Emergency Management and Response Group
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[1] AIIMS manual 2017

Introduction

Governments, at all levels, ensure reasonable protections from emergencies and disasters. When emergencies occur, communities are served best by effective preparedness, response, relief and recovery efforts.

Under Australia's constitutional arrangements, state and territory governments have primary responsibility for emergency management within their jurisdiction. However, the effects of severe or widespread disasters could exceed the capacity of an individual jurisdiction. These effects are exacerbated in the context of a catastrophic disaster.

The Australian crisis management arrangements bring together the efforts of governments, the private sector, volunteer agencies and communities to coordinate emergency management. These arrangements are based on a high level of trust and cooperation with stakeholders and communities.

Since 2000, Australia has responded successfully to a diverse range of incidents. Despite this, the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission final report, the 2011 Victorian Floods Review final report and the report of the 2011 Perth Hills Bushfire Inquiry, all highlight limitations of incident management. In addition. Recent disasters have highlighted that a diverse range of agencies should work towards a shared objective using a consolidated plan[2] that links tactical actions to the strategic whole.[3] Traditional incident-management approaches have not been structured to meet these requirements.

The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements established in response to the extreme bushfire season of 2019-20 found that planning was an essential element of being prepared for responding to disasters and to be effective planning should involve all levels of government, private sector entities and non-government organisations. Specifically, planning must identify possible consequences across the social, built, economic and natural environments. Managing catastrophic disasters through a command-and-control model is no longer enough to cover the strategic levels of planning and decision-making in the recurrent and volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments (VUCA) that catastrophic disasters present. Leaders must make sense of the complexity inherent with emergencies and disasters. Effective use of strategic planning in the planning and execution stages of crises provides the vision and the necessary information for skilled personnel at operational and tactical levels to carry out their activities aligned to the strategic intent and with unity of effort.

2 Conway, G. 2012. 'AIIMS Doctrine: have we got the fundamentals right?', Australian Journal of Emergency Management vol. 27(2).

3 Conway, G. 2012. 'AIIMS Doctrine: have we got the fundamentals right?', Australian Journal of Emergency Management vol. 27(2).

Crisis Appreciation
Strategic Planning

The Changing Face of Crises

The Changing Face of Crises

Complicated vs. Complex

Complicated problems originate from causes that can be individually distinguished. They can be addressed piece-by-piece—for each input to the system there is a proportionate output. The relevant systems can be controlled and the problems they present admit permanent solutions.

On the other hand, complex problems result from networks of multiple interacting causes that cannot be individually distinguished. They cannot be addressed in a piecemeal way, and they are such that small inputs may result in disproportionate effects. The problems they present cannot be solved once and forever but need to be systematically managed.

– Roberto Poli, Author of Working with the Future:, Ideas and Tools to Govern Uncertainty

These characteristics are exacerbated by:

- **concurrent and consecutive** events that require emergency management agencies to apply resources judiciously in response to the immediate incident and to reduce decision delay to meet accountabilities and governance expectations
- **compounding** effects of concurrent and consecutive events that result in first-, second- and third-order consequences where a nationally coordinated response allows national and international capabilities and capacity to be leveraged
- **complexity** that increases with the scale and frequency of events, compounded with concurrency challenges, requires multi-policy and multi-jurisdictional responses.[4] While emergency management arrangements make provisions for states and territories to request assistance from other jurisdictions and from the Australian Government,[5] unifying organisational missions, cultures and structures (including the private sector, non-government organisations and volunteers) remains a challenge.

The challenges of managing contemporary crises has moved from problems that are ‘complicated’ to problems that are ‘complex.

As society becomes more interconnected and interdependent, expectations increase as do the consequences of failure.

The stakes are potentially higher as we operate in an environment where actions (or inaction) can have secondary effects and detrimental consequences. Historically, incidents were typically linear and isolated.

Now, incidents and disasters can overlap and produce waves of second- and third-order effects as well as challenges.

As the scale and frequency of incidents increase, emergency managers and incident leaders face a spectrum of consequences with proportionately fewer resources.

The challenges are considerable:

- **Aligning disparate missions, cultures and structures:** Current emergency management arrangements make provisions for state and territories to request assistance from jurisdiction and the Australian Government, however, it remains a challenge to define and articulate shared-objectives across the broad-range of organisational missions, cultures and structures (including the private sector, non-government organisations and volunteers).
- **Allocating resources during consecutive and concurrent events:** On any given day there is a finite number of responders and resources available to emergency managers. Consecutive and concurrent events require emergency managers to prioritise and apply resources judiciously. They must also support decision-making at all levels in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous situations while meeting accountabilities and government expectations.
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4 https://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmc-web/Files/Strategic-Crisis-Management-paper-July-2013.pdf

5 Handbook 9: Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, pp. 4-5. At: https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/media/10162/handbook_aema_web_2023.pdf.

- **Balancing potential vs. ongoing needs:** No one knows when the next crisis will occur. Decisions to commit resources to a threat may be challenged by emerging or other critical threats. Emergency managers must make decisions regarding current needs while maintaining flexibility to meet unknown future needs – factoring in recovery and resource variables.

- **Fostering trust with communities:** In the technology and communication age, both accurate and inaccurate information can be communicated rapidly. Crisis leaders need to provide accurate information within their communities and shape the meaning that communities apply to these events to build or restore trust. This requires integrated crisis management that supports achieving shared strategic objectives.



Diagram adapted from: Crosweller M, Tschakert P. (Climate change and disasters, 2019)

- **A new paradigm:** The heuristic model demonstrates the new paradigm. The X axis indicates intensity and consequence and the Y axis depicts capability and capacity. Once we move beyond severe, the rules change; the consequences and impacts will exceed our capability and capacity and the event over runs the system's ability to respond.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identified the shifts in management between traditional preparedness and response phases and new crises.[6]

(Tables 1 and 2 below outline the OECD shifts in crisis management)

Table 1 – Preparedness Phase

Preparedness Phase -	
Traditional Crisis Management	**Contemporary Crisis Management**
• risk assessments based on historical events • scenario based emergency planning • training to test plans and procedures • early warning systems based on monitoring, forecasting, warning, communication and linked with emergency response.	• risk assessment through horizon scanning, risk radars and forward-looking analysis to detect emerging threats • frequent updates and different time scales, international analysis sharing and multi-disciplinary approaches[8] • capability-based planning and network building • strategic crisis management training to enhance agility and adaptability and develop and strengthen partnerships • strategic engagement from government.

Table 2 – Response Phase

Response Phase -	
Traditional Crisis Management	**Contemporary Crisis Management**
• command-and-control systems • standard operating procedures • strict line of responsibilities • sectoral approaches • principle of subsidiarity[7]	• crisis identification and monitoring, role of expertise • flexible and multi-purpose crisis management teams and facilities • common concepts across agencies to inform leadership with highly adaptive capacities • similar tools and protocols to be used for many crises • international cooperation • managing large response networks • ending crisis and restoring trust (communications) • seeking stakeholder feedback

Collectively, this shows that roles and responsibilities of emergency and incident management continues to evolve. The traditional command-and-control model no longer generates the flexibility and adaptability required for strategic crisis planning and decision-making during complex crises in particular when dealing with a catastrophic disaster. Executed effectively, strategic emergency planning provides the necessary information and vision to allow operational teams to work with minimal friction and in alignment with the strategic intent.

6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015. The Changing Face of Strategic Crisis Management.

[7] Principle of subsidiarity requires that decisions are made by people at the most local level possible.

[8] This may include establishing rosters of subject matter experts from a range of disciplines to support rapid mobilisation



Crisis Appreciation
Strategic Planning

The CASP Approach

The CASP Approach

NEMA developed the CASP methodology to respond to the emerging complexity of crises. CASP consists of processes and products that make the complex simple. Simple – but not necessarily easy. The fundamental purpose for using CASP is to lower the risk of negative outcomes and increase the opportunities for positive outcomes. CASP accomplishes this through a structured, systematic methodology that uses strategic and critical thinking and conceptualising the big picture in emergency planning. It focusses on the consequence management rather than the hazard management.

There is a range of incident management systems and coordination mechanisms used in Australia and internationally. These systems provide a common framework and support interoperability. However, they are designed for and are most effective at the operational level. They do not provide a framework for conceptualising or managing disasters and crises at the strategic level. The absence of a strategic focus has hampered unity of effort and synchronisation following large-scale incidents that required response across governments, non-government, private sector and community organisations and agencies.

When compounded with the challenges of time constraints, planning teams can default to a cut-and-paste mindset, reverting to what has been done in the past. In this instance, team members may make intuitive and rapid decisions based on their experiences rather than leveraging off collective experiences. While suitable for less complex tactical problems, this form of decision-making in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous conditions diminishes the level of rigour in decision-making, CASP therefore provides a process that maintains the rigour of critical thinking and analysis for planning and responding to such crises.

The CASP process facilitates diversity of thought, perspective and input so that informed decisions guide operations. It requires team input at critical steps during planning to create a ‘common operating picture’ (COP) that informs decisions and generates meaning.

Using the CASP process, decision-makers evaluate and categorise risk to ensure appropriate priority of the values at risk. The CASP creates a record of decisions, and documents how decisions were made.

This addresses shortfalls in previous responses identified by the Royal Commissions and inquiries. The outputs generated by using CASP, whether targeted at senior leaders or operational, are simple, clear, understandable and actionable. The CASP

> “It is a simple task to make things complex, it is a complex task to make things simple.
>
> – Chinese Proverb

methodology is a practical guide to plan and manage challenges systematically including:

Concurrent events: CASP helps managers triage and prioritise values at risk, lines of effort and objectives. Managers can align strategic, operational and tactical actions for the greatest effect with finite resources. Using the CASP process informs options where maximum gain is achieved with the least amount of risk necessary. Using CASP, managers can build a shared understanding of the operations, priorities and risks.

Consequence of uncertainty: CASP captures the variables inherent in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous event and provides a framework to develop multiple courses of action and contingency plans. This framework enables multiple efforts to be synchronised over space and time in a way designed to keep as many options open for as long as possible.

Complexity: Emergency/Crisis managers are required to deal with a range of strategic and operational matters associated with a crisis. In addition, they are required to consider consequences driven from political, security, infrastructure and socio-economic issues. CASP allows managers to capture, evaluate and prioritise multiple and varied issues in complex environments. This helps planning teams identify potential concerns before they occur or escalate and allows them to address risks and issues early.

Communications: CASP helps managers prioritise critical event messaging. This can give clarity to senior leadership, operational and tactical personnel, partners, stakeholders and the public by providing critical information about actions and decisions that can create confidence.

The CASP Approach

The CASP methodology was developed utilising elements of the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) and human-design thinking. In 2023 CASP was recognised as the principle emergency management strategic planning tool for the Australian Government.



Figure 2: The timeline of the CASP approach.

Conceptualising the Levels

Conceptualising the Levels of Crisis Management

Planning, decisions and operations are framed in the strategic, operational and tactical context. In practice, these do not operate in isolation and nor are they hierarchical. Each level interacts with the other, where the strategic level overlaps with the operational level and, to a significantly lesser degree, overlaps with the tactical level. The operational level overlaps with all areas in a more proportional level.



Figure 3: Level of emergency and crisis management include the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Strategic Level

At the strategic level of emergency and crisis management, national or multi-national objectives are set and resources are identified. Whether the event is jurisdictional or national in scale, early efforts must reach a unified approach to achieve the objective. There is ample doctrine that supports decision making and action at the tactical level, however, strategic-level intent has had a less prominent role. CASP addresses this gap. Conceptually, what constitutes the strategic level depends upon the nature of the crisis.

The Strategic Level can be characterised as:

1. Temporal (a span of time) generally longer term and forward looking, making plans relating to the future. Future state is defined in terms of strategic goals, objectives and a pathway to achievement. This process depends on making assumptions based on information known at the time. This approach to pre-planning is essential in coordinating complex crises[9].
2. Responsive – to achieve an immediate objective. This element of the definition required overarching strategies to be considered when quickly producing a plan of action to respond to an emerging crisis. This especially relates to planning the response to an unforeseen crisis. As the response is initiated and progresses, senior leaders must ensure that “big picture” and long term issues are not lost in the midst of high-tempo activity that is associated with a crisis response.

These two approaches are often used in isolation and applied to specific spheres. Senior crisis leaders should address both aspects of strategy concurrently.

Activities at the strategic level provide the foundation for all response actions and priorities, defining the desired end states and providing the critical sense making to support the operational and tactical levels. The Strategic Level identifies constraints and assesses risks and consequences to guide the whole of government response. Decisions made at this level serve to influence and align action at the operational and tactical Levels.

Operational Level

The operational level includes incident management systems. Here, the focus is on operational decision making and plans that implement the strategic intent.

Activities at the operational level translate the strategic intent into implementation at the tactical level and provide a direct connection between the strategic level and the tactics used. CASP establishes and helps coordinate operational actions that accomplish the strategic intent. This is done through sequencing actions to achieve the operational objectives and coordinating resources to bring about and sustain these actions

9 Preparing To Lead in a CRISIS – Dunn 2018.

Tactical Level

The tactical level is where operational actions are planned and executed. Actions are conducted under the AIIMS guidelines. The work of Incident Management Teams (IMTs) is tactical because the planning periods are usually 24 to 48 hours. AIIMS is a mature and tested system and is effective for assigning and executing day-to-day response operational actions and activities.

Relationship between Levels

Figure 4 shows where CASP and AIIMS fit together. In AIIMS, incident management structures are designed along hierarchal strata. However, this does not represent crisis management in practice. People at every level work and cooperate across all levels in order to successfully bring order to chaos. Figure 2 is representative of how all people at all levels work together in a unity of effort.



Figure 4: Where CASP and AIIMS fit together

Strategic managers must have sound situational awareness – 'ground truth' – and may intervene in operational or tactical actions where these actions have negative implications or have varied from the strategic intent. Tactical responders are most successful when they understand the strategic intent and, second- and third-order consequences of their tasks. Operational leaders are the bridge between the strategic intent and what results on the ground.

Crisis Appreciation
Strategic Planning



CASP Methodology Overview

CASP Methodology Overview

The CASP methodology consists of four major steps as shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: the CASP methodology flows from defining the environment to executing the tasks.

Time All planning takes place within the constraints of time.



Figure 6: Time – 1/3 planning and analysis, 2/3 implementation.

The relationship between time and decision-making is best expressed as a wedge.
Once you recognise a problem and begin to consider options, you enter the Time Wedge. In the wide end, you have many options and choices. As time moves you to the right, you have fewer and fewer options until you reach a point where the environment makes your decision by default.

Within CASP there are multiple time wedges. One of the first time wedges for consideration in the CASP process is the allocation of time for each of the four steps of the CASP process. Appropriate time must be allocated to undertake each step. Once you have established the time you have available to generate the initial CASP, you must plan to the time of impact for a cyclone or bushfire, to time required to load, move and stage resources for a course of action to be effective. All time wedges are best managed through backward planning. Starting at the pointy end of the wedge and working backward, to the left, incrementally allocating time to each phase or step required to ensure a plan or operation can be accomplished within the overall time available.

A principle of CASP is 'Speed to Action'. In planning for critical large-scale emergencies, CASP will almost always occur in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. In planning for. Everyone will want more time to be certain of data and facts. There are several planning maxims that state that a 50% plan well executed will always beat a 100% plan that the evolving situation makes obsolete by the time the ink is dry.

To be successful, the planning team has to accept that 60-70% information certainty is “what right looks like” in initial CASP planning. Taking more time to be more accurate or comfortable in certainty is robbing critical time for action by others in the overall time wedge of the event.

> “You can ask me for anything you like, except time.”
>
> Napoleon to his generals

Defining the Environment

Defining the environment creates a ‘common operating picture’. The common operating picture includes the situational awareness and involves consideration and sense making of the current and potential circumstances. The process can include discussion, analysis of potential consequences and impacts, experience during similar events and research and data. The process should be undertaken by planning team members and subject matter experts in order to build a robust, shared understanding of the environment to inform the values at risk.

Strategic Analysis

The centrepiece of Strategic Analysis is the strategic intent statement which provides a high level who, what, when, where and why for the entire CASP and the actions it expects to generate.

The Strategic Analysis process develops lines of effort to achieve a desired end state. The end state clarifies what the environment will look like once defined success conditions have been met.

Following a disaster, communities usually have to adapt to a new normal. Identifying an end state helps define the new normal. It represents an achievable vision to align strategic and operational action.

Once the strategic intent is developed, planners organise lines of effort to establish the success conditions necessary to achieve the end state.

Developing lines of effort breaks down the situation into manageable, purpose oriented efforts (medical treatment, triage and transport, evacuation and shelter, and infrastructure restoration) that may have distinct end states and objectives. The lines of effort are a set of practical and workable actions that support the strategic intent.

Developing Courses of Action

Planners develop courses of action by identifying broad-scale actions and evaluating those actions and relevant enablers that are required to accomplish lines of effort.

Execution

Execution and coordinating tasks involves breaking down the broad-scale courses of action into tasks and assignments appropriate for resources such as IMTs or strategic air lift. The form that these tasks and assignments take depends on agency-specific policies and requirements, for example a high level task may be the development of a briefing dashboard. Regardless of their form, tasks and assignments must align with the strategic intent and they connect to corresponding strategic priorities. In this way, operational and tactical personnel have a clear understanding of how their work fits into and supports the overall objectives.

Crisis Appreciation
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

CASP Process
How-To Steps

CASP - a practical approach through critical thinking

The CASP process promotes disciplined critical thinking and team discussions to consider the scope and scale of an incident and the proposed response.

The CASP is designed to produce meaningful responses to the consequences of a crisis. CASP centres on critical thinking, dialogue, analysis and understanding.

CASP templates offer a structure to rapidly build situational awareness, interpret complex situations and develop shared understanding. Templates are tools to structure the deliberations and record conclusions and decisions. They can be recalled and connected to subsequent discussions and provide visual displays. Completed templates are combined into a common operating picture 'dashboard' so that context, relationships and decisions can be referenced. *(See example dashboard at Appendix A)*

Critical thinking and rigour in the planning team dialogue are critical at each step of CASP. Research and practical experience overwhelmingly demonstrates the value of engaging key stakeholders and planners in this process.

The process provides a structured means by which the CASP team brings together experience, intelligence, research and data to support analysis of the situation. The rigour applied to each step ensures the efficacy of critical thinking and consideration of risks, resulting in the best possible outcomes from the CASP process.

> "The planning is more important than the plan".
>
> – Summary of several quotes by Winston Churchill and Dwight D. Eisenhower

Good Practice

Having a diverse group of key planners contributes and leverages each person's unique perspectives, experiences, worldviews and functional expertise to develop shared situational understanding. The CASP Process can be facilitated efficiently by:

Understanding and defining the intent and requirements of the CASP by developing a CASP Intent Statement to allow the planning team to achieve the identified task.

Engaging a diverse and broad group of planners in the process is the most effective way to quickly develop shared meaning across the team. At the conclusion of the process, the planning team should have common awareness and understanding of the vast dimensions and aspects of the disaster, which allows them to be more effective in pursuing their specific functional responsibilities.

Designating a CASP leader to provide coordination, oversight and focus and a time keeper to monitor time constraints.

Establishing the team separate to other planning and operational activities. Use visual resources such as whiteboards or screens, in an area where information can be displayed and reviewed, as the team works through the process. Keeping people focused, interactively engaged and maintaining discipline to timings, assists in completing the process.

Conducting the initial process using a small group of planning specialists and then validating decisions, and conclusions with subject matter experts or other critical stakeholders that have equity in the outcomes of the CASP.

Drawing in a broader group of stakeholders to validate the decisions and conclusions to build awareness and understanding of the dimensions and aspects of the event, particularly those that have equity in the lines of effort.

Defining the Environment

Defining the Environment



Figure 7: The CASP methodology flows from defining the environment to executing the tasks.

Defining the environment involves laying the foundation of the common operating picture by outlining the incident environment. Initial first discussions establish the scope to ensure that the planning team fully understands the incident parameters and that the critical issues are highlighted. Inputs include data from situation reports, media or other sources (formal and informal).

The length of time required to establish the initial common operating picture varies and can be 15 – 20 minutes for 'no notice' incidents, 30 – 45 minutes for emerging incidents and more than 60 minutes for long-range incidents.

Note: The process of collecting, assessing and documenting information to define the environment is an ongoing and iterative process. The first attempt may be quick and rough. The components of the common operating picture should be improved as soon as time and resources allow. It should be reviewed and updated daily and more often if the incident warrants.

Scoping the Incident Environment and establishing a Common Operating Picture (COP).

The incident environment template allows teams to establish the primary components of the common operating picture.

Template fields

CASP Intent Statement: provides clear direction to the planning team on CASP tasking. The CASP Intent Statement should be the first step of the process, articulating the purpose and intent of the CASP to the planning team. It should include:

- who
- to conduct what essential task
- subtask
- action
- what
- when

Example: The Crisis Coordination Team undertakes planning on behalf of the Australian Government to determine potential support options for Jurisdictions in response to severe flooding events on the east coast. The initial CASP is to be completed in 3 hours, for a planning period of 10 days.

Area of Operations: the geographical area directly affected by the emergency or crisis and where tactical operations will occur. It might include areas of bushfire, flood, cyclone, dam failure or earthquake etc., or the location where activities such as search and rescue, fire suppression or infrastructure reconstruction might occur.

Area of Interest: extends beyond the area of operations to include locations that may be affected by second- and third-order consequences of the incident. For example, a community that has been isolated because of damage to an access road. Planners should identify areas that are affected as well as those that may be affected.

Area of Consequence: the broadest view of the incident and includes second-, third- and fourth-order effects. This area can extend to other jurisdictions and to other countries or influence socio-economic systems.

Example: A monsoon trough in 2019 caused significant flooding in North Queensland. The flood had second-order effects on the cattle industry and third-order effects on wine production and prices. In addition, there were fourth-order effects of economic impacts on the rest of the country in some form. In defining 'area of consequence', planners measure effects on communities such as disruptions to government services, people's livelihoods, education and recreation as well as critical infrastructure or supply lines that disrupt supply chains for food or industry.

Note: When considering time effects, a good-practices approach is a one-third/two-third rule. Working back from the action required, one-third of time should be spent on planning and two-thirds on executing the task.

Weighing Critical Factors and PSESIIE Dimensions

After developing the parameters of the incident environment, planners weigh critical factors and the Public Administration, Social, Economic, Security, Infrastructure, Information and Environment (PSESIIE) dimensions.

The focus on critical factors generates robust discussion to consider the situation from all aspects. **Critical factor** groupings are taken from the philosophy of Sun Tzu, a strategic genius who wrote *The Art of War* in 500 BC. Sun Tzu's philosophy assesses information through the lens of contrast, assessing elements from opposing points of view. The result is a well-rounded and comprehensive appraisal of the situation.

When weighing critical factors, the team considers eight blocks of situational intelligence:

- The **unknown** versus the **known**.
- What **can be controlled or influenced** versus **what cannot be controlled or influenced.**
- Relative **strengths** versus relative **weaknesses**.
- **Inherent dangers** versus **unique opportunities**.

PSESIIE dimensions show that incidents are ultimately about disruption to societal norms, systems and expectations. Incident leaders account for these impacts and opportunities to achieve the mission.

The strategic aspects of an incident can be identified and assessed by considering the PSESIIE dimensions. The incident isn't resolved until disruptions to the PSESIIE dimensions are resolved or mitigated. It is important to note that some topics, such as shutting down a power grid, may apply to multiple PSESIIE dimensions.

- **Public Administration:** the attitudes and concerns of governments, public administration, political and public figures or groups towards a problem, policy or actions; the probable effects of the incident or response actions on these figures or groups.
- **Social:** the consequences to humans and the way they live, work, play, relate to each another, organise to meet their needs and cope as members of society. This includes cultural aspects involving changes to the norms, values and beliefs that guide and rationalise people's cognition of self and society. These may be short-term effects or long-term changes.
- **Economic:** the direct damage caused to physical structures and structure content as well as the indirect damage caused when people lose incomes and livelihoods. Direct and indirect damage cause adverse longer-term consequences for economic stability, growth, development and poverty reduction. These consequences are generally negative but economic opportunities can be identified.
- **Security:** the protection of human, physical and intellectual assets. Security also embodies the personal, emotional and mental sense of being secure.
- **Infrastructure:** the damage to essential services of shelter, water and sanitation, power (electricity, gas, oil, coal), transportation (road, rail, air, water), communications (radio, landlines, mobile phone, satellite phone), technology (internet), food production and distribution, public health and medicine (hospitals, emergency medical services), financial services and security services (military, police, corrections).
- **Information:** the public perception of the incident and the effects of influencers and advocates. This

includes the information needs of people and organisations, creating and distributing relevant information and key messaging.

- **Environment:** the environmental and heritage values where direct or indirect damage may cause long lasting effects on the environment or society. These are considered in the context of the areas of operation, interest and consequence.

Collectively, the assessments of the critical factors and PSESIIE dimensions become the context of the incident and are fundamental to the common operating picture.

Note: It is best to examine and discuss the critical factors and PSESIIE dimensions simultaneously with two scribes, each capturing ideas for each one. The scribes need to be attentive to what people are saying to determine where the information fits in the templates. When a piece of information could apply in several areas, it may be a strong indicator that that issue has a higher level of priority.

Threat Effects – Most Likely or Most Dangerous: this section requires planners to consider and describe the unfolding incident. Predictions rely on team members' intuition and are based on collective expertise, experience and what is known about the event. The team's collective assessment of the **Most Likely** predictions shapes primary efforts with common sense solutions. The **Most Dangerous** predictions presses team members (and those they brief) to consider credible worst-case scenarios and identify trigger points for escalation.

Time Effects: in considering time effects, team members discuss the urgency of their planning efforts in relation to the incident and its management. Depending on the status of the incident, considerations may include how to best spend time before an event (such as the landfall of a cyclone) or when outputs of the planning process, such as recommended courses of action, need to be complete.

Identifying Values at Risk

The significance of an incident is defined by the level and scope of social disruption. Identifying the societal components—the 'values at risk'—that are being threatened or disrupted is important. To counter threats to societal values, it is essential to identify what those values are, why the threats are meaningful and their level of significance.

This high-level consideration includes values at risk that have strategic implications. Developing a complete list of values at risk guides all downstream activities, such as resource prioritisation and allocation, financial expenditures, hazard and risk mitigation and other critical decisions.

The template 'Values at Risk' structures discussions regarding the values at risk.

- **Values at risk:** the high-level incident priorities of human life, critical infrastructure, basic human needs, ecosystems and law and order.
- **Description of values at risk:** provides clarity and detail for the high-level priority. For example, if the value at risk is critical infrastructure, the description might define the specific aspect of the critical infrastructure component at risk (e.g., water supply to the city of 100,000 people).
- **Jurisdiction/ownership:** the agency, entity or authority that is responsible for the value; public or private, government or non-government. This can be as specific or general as necessary to identify the stakeholders or responsible parties needed for management and coordination.
- **Consequences:** the assessment of the scope and scale of the incident on life, health and safety as well as the PSESIIE dimensions. Previous discussions measure probability, so here managers consider the potential severity of the impacts.

  Example:

  If a city's water supply is at risk of being polluted and rendered unusable for a long period of time, the situation would significantly affect the lives and health of residents and there would likely be significant PSESIIE consequences.

- **Priority** the first pass through the worksheet to identify values at risk allows assessment of the potential effects. It is too early for an accurate assessment of the relative priorities. Ranking the relative priority of the values at risk can be challenging. Team members weigh low probability, high consequence threats against high probability, low consequence situations. The priorities determined should align with the overall incident priorities. Once in place, priorities inform the allocation of resources, justify the expenditure of money and balancing the operational risk versus benefit.

Forming Big Questions and Key Assumptions

Working through the incident environment, critical factors, PSESIIE dimensions and values at risk, two important deliberations emerge: big questions and key assumptions.

- **Big questions:** The three to five questions about primary unknowns that, once answered, have a significant impact on how the team views and manages the incident.

Example:

During a flood event, a question might be whether a critical and aging levee will hold or breach. Another could be the percentage of housing stock that is built to code and can withstand a specific category of cyclone. One outcome may create a set of opportunities while the other identifies threats and complexities.

- **Key assumptions:** The assumptions made during initial assessment that, if verified or proven false, could have a significant impact on how the team views or manages the incident.

Example:

During the flood (see previous), the team builds into their common operating picture analysis that the weather for the foreseeable future is going to be warm and sunny and an assumption is made that the levy will hold. This assumption would be documented in template fields of Environment, Predictions (both Most Likely and Most Dangerous), Strengths, Opportunities and, potentially, all of the PSESSIIE dimensions. This assumption would influence subsequent planning steps including recommended actions, trigger points of concern, courses of action and so on.

Documenting big questions and key assumptions, and incorporating them into the common operating picture dashboard gives them visibility. This reduces the possibility that changes to big questions and key assumptions are lost.

Big questions and key assumptions are included in the common operating picture briefing to underscore the constraints or limitations of the team's analysis and situational understanding.

Establishing Trigger Points of Concern

A recurring shortfall during planning is failing to identify conditions that warrant re-evaluating the plan and the assumptions on which it is built. Trigger points of concern are the situations and conditions that necessitate re-evaluation of any component of the common operation picture (incident environment, critical factors, PSESIIE dimensions, big questions and key assumptions).

These trigger points include spatial or geographic factors (e.g., when the fire crosses Highway XX), temporal aspects (e.g. when the hurricane is 12 hours from making landfall) and event-specific activities (e.g. when a Coordination or Control Centre is overwhelmed). A list of trigger points is not all inclusive but identifies two to five high-impact conditions that, if triggered, would potentially challenge or confirm the validity of the common operating picture. Recording trigger points of concern within the common operating picture dashboard keeps them visible to planners and incident managers.

Determining Immediate Actions

Defining the environment focuses on the situational 'what' and 'so what'. Defining the immediate actions is based on 'what is known so far'.

Determining immediate actions can be limited but should remain at a high level. They could be:

- do nothing
- monitor progress
- plan contingencies
- activate systems, plans or resources on standby
- mobilise and deploy resources immediately.

Immediate actions should be documented and displayed as well as recorded in the common operating picture dashboard.

Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis



Figure 8: The CASP methodology flow from defining the environment to executing the tasks.

Strategic Analysis involves four interrelated processes:

- developing priorities
- conducting gap analysis
- developing desired end state
- defining lines of effort and success conditions.

Working through these processes defines what success looks like by describing the desired outcomes. Using the COP when defining the environment the planning team can define the leader's intent and the vision for moving forward.

Articulating and Validating Strategic Intent

The steps taken to define the strategic intent statement should be linked directly back to the identified values at risk and likely strategic lines of effort. The nature of the incident will determine to what extent the intent must be validated or formally approved. The strategic intent statement should clearly articulate what the intent of the planning activity is for and include consideration of who, what, for, why and by when.

Validating the strategic intent will align it with the executive decision-maker (senior department leaders and ministers). It is important to limit downstream confusion or conflict. Work conducted thus far is based on information the planning team has gleaned and synthesised in a relatively short period of time and it is directed at understanding the situation and defining what success looks like. While these efforts are the foundation of the team leader's intent, the CASP process is about the executive authority's intent. When the executive agrees that the team's understanding and vision is consistent with their own, then trust is created, which is vital to shaping confidence, communication and cohesion.

If formal approval is required the process should be identified early. It is essential to know who needs to be involved, their availability (24/7? office hours only? with 1-hour notice or 24-hour notice?) and what actions can or cannot be taken if approval is absent?

All of these can have a profound effect on the team's ability to begin additional planning efforts and/or can limit operational activities.

Determining Priorities

Managing an emergency or crisis is ultimately about making difficult choices concerning allocation of resources, expenditure, exposure to hazards or high levels of risk and, perhaps, life and death. These choices are often made with little time and, frequently, without guidance and permission through chains of authority.

Incident priorities include generally accepted social and moral priorities of:

1. preserving life
2. suppling essential humanitarian needs
3. preventing further harm or suffering
4. maintaining governance and law and order
5. providing essential services and infrastructure
6. preserving cultural ethos and values
7. maintaining communication and public trust.

Incident priorities will always change. Whilst the protection of human life will always be the top priority, when using the CASP in an all hazards context. For example, in a maritime incident the protection of the environment may be number one priority if there is not risk to human life. Not all the priorities listed may be present in a given incident. Other priorities may be listed depending on need and the PSESIIE dimensions. However, most lists of incident priorities will be similar in order and description to the one shown.

Planners validate incident priorities at a high (macro-scale) level. The strategic planning team interprets executive intent and validates the incident priorities. Once the macro-scale incident priorities are validated, the team can revisit the values at risk and prioritise them to correspond with the incident priorities.

Building on the work completed in ‘Defining the Environment’, the priority column on the Values at Risk Template is referenced, which informs the gap analysis discussion.

Conducting Gap Analysis

The gap analysis involves comparing current conditions and desired conditions to identify what actions are necessary to bridge the gap from the current situation to the desired end state (refer figure 6).

Current conditions are the reasons a strategic plan is needed. They are the disruption to society and social systems that often inform disaster/emergency declarations. The identified effects or disorders are key at a high level.

For each identified disorder, the team identified the acceptable level of order. There are several caveats in determining what is acceptable:

- It is essential to identify what it means to resolve each problem or disorder.
- The key is to identify what is acceptable, as opposed to 'back to normal', fully fixed or rebuilt or what might be wanted in the long term.
- Desired conditions should describe the acceptable state.

Examples of current (disorder) conditions include:

- mass casualties
- dangerous conditions to life
- inadequate emergency and health services (e.g. 'ventilator capacity exceeded – 323 COVID-19 ICU patients need access')
- outbreak of disease
- lack of drinking water
- lack of food
- unsanitary conditions
- people displaced, exposed
- government services disrupted
- lawlessness and civil unrest
- air, ground, sea transport disrupted
- major infrastructure damage
- economic instability
- power grid failure
- communication networks damaged
- environmental scale damage.

Examples of desired conditions (acceptable order) include:

- acceptably safe environment
- emergency services available (e.g. 'hospital, ICU and ventilator capacity meet patient requirements')
- disease controlled
- adequate potable water
- adequate food supply
- acceptably clean environment
- adequate shelter available
- effective government services
- effective judicial system
- acceptable level of security
- economic stability and opportunity
- travel unrestricted
- access to information
- sustainable ecosystems
- sense of community.

STRATEGIC INCIDENT PRIORITIES
1. preserve life **2.** supply essential humanitarian needs **3.** prevent further harm or suffering **4.** maintain governance and law and order **5.** provide essential services and infrastructure **6.** preserve cultural ethos or values **7.** maintain communication and public trust.

Gaps between disorder and acceptable order will drive crisis priorities

CURRENT CONDITIONS (DISORDER)	GAP ANALYSIS	DESIRED CONDITIONS (ACCEPTABLE ORDER)
• uncontrolled fire • schools closed • some power outages • communications networks disrupted • transport disruptions • road closures • conservation area damaged.		• fires fully contained • schools reopened • power restored • communications restored • transport services return to normal • roads reopened • threats to conservation area fully mitigated.

Figure 9: Gap analysis showing incidents priorities, current conditions and desired conditions.

Defining the Planned End State

Establishing the planned end state is crucial to establishing organisational and situational alignment from the highest levels of political or executive authority out to tactically engaged resources. Gaining agreement on the planned end state and the definitions of success allows influence, resources and capabilities to be aligned towards achieving the desired end state.

The end state is an expression of the nature and scope of the leader's intent. The end state specifically describes what success looks like and gives operators a defined target for their actions. It may not mean that conditions are as they were before the incident because the situation may never be resolved to that degree.

An operation will have success criteria specific to the phase. For example, the end state relative to incident stabilisation may focus on rescues, suppression or containment while the end state for long-term recovery may centre on infrastructure reconstruction, repopulation or decontamination.

Defining an end state adds value to the response by providing a concrete means for gaining alignment of intent and a shared vision with administrators, elected officials and key leaders and stakeholders.

Components of the End State

An end state defines what right looks like and creates concentric action at all levels. In practice, end states should always be written in past or present tense.

Example: The fires are/were fully suppressed. All displaced residents are/were in acceptable shelters. Roads are/were passible to emergency traffic. Power is/was restored to the affected area.

The tense creates a true or false quality to the statement that enables validation and measurement. When each statement in the end state is true, success is achieved. While any statement in the end state is not true, continued action is required.

Developing an End State

The work necessary to build an end state is accomplished during the gap analysis where the desired condition for each high-level disorder has been articulated and success has been defined. The final step is to identify which conditions have the highest priority.

Following is an example initial planned end state with conditions prioritised to align with incident priorities:

Example: Working with state and territory governments, the Australian Government supported response agencies in saving lives. Affected people were evacuated. A functional health system was established to provide emergency health services to people affected. Essential supply routes, infrastructure and services have been restored. Affected communities received supplies and support to meet essential humanitarian needs and they were treated with dignity. Providing information was a coordinated national effort. Early recovery activities were established.

The end state is a *planned* end state and is based on the available information at the time it was developed. The planned end state may change or need refinement as the incident progresses and additional situational information and understanding becomes available.

Note: To write the planned end state, determine the desired condition for each high-level disorder. Take each desired condition in order of priority and write these in the 'Strategic Analysis' section of the Strategic Analysis table. Each statement must be in past or present tense to establish the necessary binary (true/false) tension. Once completed, the planned end state will be a paragraph that defines the conditions necessary for the successful resolution of that aspect of the incident to establish the necessary binary (true/false) tension.

Developing Lines of Effort and Success Conditions

Once the planned end state has been defined, the next step is to develop the lines of effort necessary to achieve the end state. Lines of effort link strategic and operational objectives using the logic of purpose (cause and effect) to achieve the end state. Defining lines of effort helps teams visualise, execute and measure their part of the operation.

Objectives are SMART—Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-Based. On larger, volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous incidents, lines of effort are needed to break down the enormity of the situation into discrete, purpose-oriented efforts, which may also have distinct end states, tactical objectives and success conditions.

Possible lines of effort include:

- emergency saving of life and medical treatment
- humanitarian relief and assistance
- restoration of governance, law and order
- infrastructure restoration.

In whatever way they may be written or defined, lines of effort must contribute to achieving the end state.

Part of the process of developing lines of effort is defining related success conditions. One way to think of success conditions is that they are 'mini end states'. For each line of effort it is important to articulate the required conditions defining success in order to describe exactly the nature and scope of the leader's intent.

The primary difference between lines of effort success conditions and the end state is that success conditions are near-term, and give effect of the specific lines of effort, whereas the end state could encompass conditions over a longer term. Consequently, for the duration of the incident, each line of effort will have multiple success conditions that act as milestones. They cumulatively result in achievement or resolution of each line of effort. Once all the lines of effort have been resolved, the end state will have been achieved. In the same manner as the incident end state, lines of effort success conditions are written in past or present tense.

Table 3: Examples of lines and efforts and possible success conditions.

Lines of Effort	Success Conditions
1. Provision of emergency saving of life and medical treatment.	People who could be rescued were rescued within 72 hours. Emergency medical treatment was provided to people with urgent needs.
2. Provision of immediate humanitarian relief and assistance.	All people who were displaced had access to immediate humanitarian needs within 48 hours.
3. Restoration of governance, public safety, law and order.	Governance and public order were restored within 24 hours.
4. Assessment of critical infrastructure requiring restoration.	Initial assessment of damaged critical infrastructure was initiated within 24 hours.

Identifying Essential Strategic Tasks

Prior to the validation of the strategic intent, high-level challenges may be uncovered that need to be addressed. These challenges are considered 'essential strategic tasks' because failure to obtain resolution may impede the incident. Essential strategic tasks need the authority for approval by delegated levels of jurisdiction or particular agencies.

Example: Government-level authority is required to make an immigration decision to allow foreign medical school graduates to practice in emergency rooms during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

Updating the Time Wedge and Effects of Time

In Defining the Environment, the team considered the time effects of the situation. The one-third-two-third principle (one-third for planning and two-thirds to implement or action) applies. With the strategic intent approved or validated, it is important to consider 'the time wedge'.

If the time of an event is known such as the forecasted landfall of a cyclone, a flood peak or a wind change for a fire, teams must plan backwards from that time and consider the planning and related tasks to be accomplished in the available time – 'the time wedge'.

- What needs to be communicated and to whom?
- Do warning orders need to go out to the public?
- Do resources need to be put on standby or prepositioned?
- Are there any exemptions needed from federal, state, territory or local policies?
- How much time will it take to do….?

Developing Key Messages

The common operating picture, strategic analysis and the strategic intent provide the material for crisis communication specialists to develop key messages. Public information issues can tend to focus on what is going on. In contrast, questions from the media and the public are more likely to focus on why the government is doing a particular action and where everything is headed. The CASP process provides that information early in the crisis timeline.

Developing Courses of Action

Developing Courses of Action

With the strategic intent formulated, planning commences to inform the operational level of incident management. Specifically, courses of action identify the broad-scale actions and tasks that achieve the desired end state.



Figure 10: The CASP methodology flows from defining the environment to executing the tasks.

The Planning Team has been defining the environment, strategic analysis and approving the strategic intent.

The team should include additional subject matter experts and provide in developing courses of actions. Conclusions generated from the planning process are valuable to answer questions:

- What are the acceptable levels of risk or actions for responders in relation to the values at risk?
- What are the desired or expected levels of efficiency (e.g. cost?)
- How effective do operations need to be (e.g. is 70 per cent resolution adequate or is the target 100 per cent?)
- What are the special considerations identified (especially big questions and key assumptions) that are needed to develop courses of action?

- **Lines of effort number** is transcribed from the strategic analysis end state and lines of effort.
- **Success conditions** are transcribed or referenced from the strategic analysis lines of effort.
- **Courses of action** are the descriptions to the potential solutions. Planners generate and compare options consistent with the team leader's intent to select the best one (e.g. two courses of action may be to place a single agency in charge or mobilise a Joint Taskforce).

  Options are based on the success conditions, considerations and critical shortfalls, menu of capabilities/providers and is consistent with the constraints.
- **Responsible agency or providers** is the agencies, people, expertise, equipment and other resources available to commit or that can be requested to support an event. This list can include non-traditional resources.
- **Assumptions:**
  + **Planning assumptions.** Any piece of planning information that must become a fact for the plan to succeed. These would include essential strategic tasks and other issues that impede the response or situations that cannot be overcome by adapting or improvising.
  + This is an opportunity to ask questions such as:
    - Do we have critical information requirements defined to turn those assumptions into facts?
    - Do we have no-later-than time requirements identified to validate any assumptions?
- **Risks to success** are based on a high-level risk assessment looking at identified PSESIIE dimension issues and relative effectiveness shortfalls that may hamper achieving the success conditions. The factors below may be considered when assessing the risks to success.

  + **Constraints** are the legal, policy, financial and moral restrictions that determine the must do's (requirements) and cannot do's (prohibiting factors). This includes identifying operational security restrictions.

    Defining the constraints early narrows the range of courses of action by removing options that are prohibited or that would potentially violate an organisation's authorities. Also, by articulating requirements, teams can establish methods and means so that defined courses of action maintain fidelity to those requirements.

  + **Considerations and critical shortfalls** are based on the assessment of the relative effectiveness of the current response effort to identify gaps or needs. Relative effectiveness categories could include measurement of:
    - unity of command
    - intelligence
    - operational level risks
    - security
    - offensive/defensive capability
    - sustainment
    - communication
    - public or political perception
    - leadership.

  + **Advantages/Disadvantages** are anything that may impact on the mobilisation, deployment, use and demobilisation. Considerations might include:
    - acceptable risks and vulnerabilities
    - effectiveness
    - organisational values
    - redundancy
    - simplicity
    - flexibility
    - speed
    - positioning
    - sustainability
    - surge and reserve capacity
    - cost
    - contingencies
    - perception
    - political
    - legal or policy-driven rules of engagement
    - second and third order effects.

Executing the Plan

Executing the Plan

The CASP process is an investment in critical thinking and is essential for successful execution.



Figure 11: The CASP methodology flows from defining the environment to executing the tasks.

Careful strategic thinking and planning is the necessary foundational work to enable tactical operators to efficiently and effectively execute the leaders intent, with all efforts aligned to a common end state.

CASP Outcomes

Execution and the outputs/outcomes of CASP will be different depending on the purpose of the CASP and the authorities involved.

The CASP outcome could be a recommendation for a National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) meeting, or potential response options. The output could be the development of a dashboard and a briefing to those involved.

It could be the provision of a guidance document or recommendations to encourage a unity of effort across a whole of community response.

The output could be requests or tasking's to agencies based on existing arrangements.

Providing Strategic Tasks

The process of providing strategic tasks varies and often uses documents, processes and formats such as Delegations of Authority or tasking's. The end format is determined by what is necessary to meet agency-specific policies and requirements. Nonetheless, while addressing unique specifications, any format should include the critical elements generated from the planning efforts, namely the elements of leaders intent: Task, Purpose and End State.

Coordinating and Synchronising Efforts

Coordinating and synchronising the activities, needs and requirements is crucial to success and efficiency in deployment of capabilities and realising desired effects.

For example, a decision about lifting disaster or security declarations after a catastrophic event cannot be made without a series of security conditions being met, policy decisions being finalised, and the capacity of local law enforcement being re-established. This type of a decision triggers its own sequence of actions from demobilising military assets to setting up press conferences and coordinating social media posts.

The synchronisation helps facilitate coordination of effort so that the elements of action, tempo, sequence and location result in the right things happening in the right order at the right time.

Conclusion

Conclusion

CASP should not be a rote process, where ticking boxes is more important than the well-considered meaning this strategic planning process provides. The increasing frequency, intensity and duration of disasters in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous conditions requires an evolved methodology and toolset.

CASP informs strategic operational planning and is the strategic bridge between preparedness plans and operational action once a crisis is imminent, has occurred or is transitioning to recovery.

CASP leverages concepts that align disparate organisational missions, cultures and structures and provide the tools for leaders to communicate and to enable emergency managers to fulfil their roles. It supports leaders to make sense of inherent complexity of contemporary disasters and make decisions supported through a process of critical thinking and analysis. CASP is flexible and adaptable and when done effectively provides the vision, strategic intent and alignment of activities that gives effect to the unity of effort. CASP will continue to evolve as the future crisis environment dictates.



Appendix A:
CASP Template

DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT	
EVENT NAME:	**DATE:**
CASP ANALYSIS TIME:	**END STATE PLANNING PERIOD:**

CASP INTENT STATEMENT
Who? Conducts what? For? In order to? By when?
Insert Map showing area of consequence

AREA OF OPERATIONS	AREA OF INTEREST	AREA OF CONSEQUENCE

SITUATION

CRITICAL FACTORS			
KNOWNS	UNKNOWNS	CAN CONTROL	CANNOT CONTROL
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	DANGERS

PSESIIE	
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	SECURITY
ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE	INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT	

THREAT EFFECTS	
MOST LIKELY	MOST DANGEROUS

VALUES AT RISK			
VALUE AT RISK (VAR)	DESCRIPTION/IMPACT OF VAR	VAR OWNER	PRIORITY

BIG QUESTIONS

KEY ASSUMPTIONS	TRIGGER POINTS OF CONCERN

AGENCY ACTIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
PLAN MONITOR ACTIVATE EXECUTE	

END STATE PLANNING	
DATE:	**PLANNING PERIOD:**

STRATEGIC INTENT STATEMENT:
Who? Does what? For? In order to? By when?

STRATEGIC INCIDENT PRIORITIES (IN ORDER)	CURRENT EFFECTS (DISORDER)	DESIRED EFFECTS (ACCEPTABLE ORDER)
END STATE	**LINES OF EFFORT**	**SUCCESS CONDITIONS**

COURSES OF ACTION						
LINE OF EFFORT	SUCCESS CONDITION	COURSE OF ACTION	RESPONSIBLE ENTITY	ASSUMPTIONS	RISKS TO SUCCESS	AUTHORITY

Appendix B: CASP Example

EXAMPLE CASP ONLY

DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT

EVENT: Tropical Cyclone Quentin	**DATE:** 1 February 2024
CASP ANALYSIS TIME: 2 hours	**END STATE PLANNING PERIOD:** 4 days (to 5 February 2024)

CASP INTENT STATEMENT

The Crisis Coordination team conducts assumptions based planning on behalf of the Australian Government, to determine the likely impacts and consequences to Tropical Cyclone Quentin in order to identify support options to Queensland. The analysis is to be completed in 2 hours and the planning end state period is out to 4 days (2 days post impact).



EXAMPLE CASP ONLY

AREA OF OPERATIONS	AREA OF INTEREST	AREA OF CONSEQUENCE
Cairns, Innisfail, Cardwell	North Queensland	Australia

SITUATION

At 8am today (1 February, 2024) TC Quentin, situated 1390km east northeast of Cairns, has intensified to a Severe Tropical Cyclone - Category 3. TC Quentin is expected to further strengthen and track south southwest into the Coral Sea overnight. It is forecast to reach high end category 4 intensity in the early hours of 2 February, 2024 before making landfall between Cairns and Innisfail in the early evening of February 2, 2024.
The Deputy Coordinator General NEMA has authorised a phase change of COMDISPLAN from standby to active in anticipation of any Requests for Assistance from Queensland.

CRITICAL FACTORS

KNOWNS	UNKNOWNS	CAN CONTROL	CANNOT CONTROL
• TC Quentin is approaching Queensland coast line with a current intensity of Category 3 • Anticipated strengthening to Category 4 prior to landfall. • COMDISPLAN has been activated • State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC) has been moved to STAND UP	• Reliability of TC tracking • Community preparedness • Resilience of communities in active recovery from previous events • Timing of landfall • Airport closures • Assistance required from Commonwealth	• Aus Gov leadership messaging • Aus Gov preparedness and response including CCT activation • NCM meetings, AGCRC meetings and NEMA reporting	• Jurisdictional response • Community response • Misinformation • Cyclone track or intensity • Storm surge

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	DANGERS
• QLD well practiced in cyclone and flood • Aus Gov support mechanisms (NCM, AGCRC) • NEMA relationship with QLD • NEMA Liaison Officer situated in the SDCC • Jurisdictional plans are in place and operating • NSR analytical capability	• Potential for other concurrent events nationally • The potential reluctance of some communities/groups to evacuate • Public expectation for ADF in effected communities • Community's potential mistrust of forecast information	• Ongoing engagement with QLD stakeholders • Further test non-ADF capabilities • New NEMA capabilities (e.g. NEMS) • Opportunity to engage with private sector stakeholders for response	• Damage from TC impact • Potential rain event causing flooding • Incident fatigue and psychosocial health • Community isolation • Concurrent incidents impacting capability and capacity • The track or flood modelling is incorrect • Potentially increased numbers of tourists • Potential for loss of life

PSESIIE

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	SECURITY
• State election year • Significant political interest • Impacts of concurrent events on recovery • Climate demonstrations • Public desire to assist	• Property Security of evacuated homes • Possible opportunistic crime • Potential for panic buying • Food security with impacted supply chain • Isolation of communities • Security at evacuation centres

EXAMPLE CASP ONLY

ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
• Impact on agriculture (e.g. sugarcane and bananas) • Aquaculture impacts (e.g. prawn and barramundi) • Damages to local business, causing job loss and long term employment • Supply chain impacts – delayed deliveries due to road closures and food/goods shortages • Potential impact to tourist industry • Seasonal workers	• Impacts to vulnerable communities, including rural, indigenous and remote communities • Community vulnerabilities Effect of potential property and business loss • Psychosocial health considerations • Reduced access to support services to elderly or vulnerable communities • Potential for increased gender based violence
INFRASTRUCTURE	**INFORMATION**
• High likelihood of loss and damage to property • Potential for extended power outages • Loss of telecommunications • Loss of road and rail infrastructure • Long term impact to freight • Current supply chain issues delaying supply of materials for repairing damaged infrastructure	• Public messaging mechanisms are established and practiced • Information is being shared between NEMA, QLD, BOM and Defence • BoM flooding warnings • NEMA Dashboards can be produced and shared • Social media monitoring by NEMA
ENVIRONMENT	
• UNESCO World Heritage Area (possible impacts to the Great Barrier Reef) • Potential for threatened species flora and fauna located in rainforest • Potential impact to endangered species • Agricultural impacts • Potential for marine pollution from damaged vessels	

THREAT EFFECTS

MOST LIKELY	MOST DANGEROUS
• Preparedness activities will be effective • Cyclone will impact at Category 4 causing damage to property and businesses • Power and Comms outages • Evacuation and relief centres will be operational • State resources and capacity not exceeded • Probability of short-term ADF support requirements • Ongoing road closures & some impacts on supply routes • Flooding to continue post impact	• Cyclone impacts at high category 5 • Severe flooding post impact • Jurisdictional capacity exceeded • Australian Government assistance required • Loss of life • Major loss of housing and infrastructure • Mass evacuations / displaced people • Hospital system overwhelmed • Communicable disease spread • Significant implications for supply routes • Isolated communities • Severe impacts to agriculture and environment

EXAMPLE CASP ONLY

VALUES AT RISK

VALUE AT RISK (VAR)	DESCRIPTION/IMPACT OF VAR	VAR OWNER	PRIORITY
Human Life	Protection of human life during and post impact	Queensland Police Service	1
Humanitarian relief and assistance	Displaced communities at risk	Queensland Reconstruction Authority	2
Critical Infrastructure	Loss of essential power and telecommunications	QLD power companies and Telco's	3
Law and order	Opportunistic crime, loss of regard for law	Queensland Police Service	4

BIG QUESTIONS

- Are there current evacuation centres open?
- What is the forecast for further/future forecast rainfall?
- Does Queensland have capacity to continue to manage the impacts and consequences, including in the event of forecast rain?
- What is the likelihood of requests for Australian Government assistance?
- Australian capacity to support national resource sharing?
- What is the likely scale of and capacity to support public health requirements (eg, disease control and psychosocial health)?
- Capacity for critical supply chains and industries to assist in recovery?
- Are vulnerable communities getting the assistance they need?

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- QLD have capacity to respond
- ADF will be available to provide assistance, if requested
- Forecast conditions will eventuate
- Current EM arrangements in place and working
- Australian Government will provide assistance (if requested) and continue to and take a pro-active role.
- Community will engage with emergency response messaging
- Resource sharing arrangements will be adequate to meet need, if required

TRIGGER POINTS OF CONCERN

- Cyclone intensifies to a Category 5 prior to landfall
- Loss of human life
- Jurisdictions exceed their response capacity/capabilities
- Evacuation centres overwhelmed
- Community complacency and lack of response/adherence to warnings
- NED thresholds met
- More rainfall leading to flooding in both impacted and new locations
- Concurrent crisis events in the rest of the country
- Increased social unrest and unlawful activity

AGENCY ACTIONS

- Maintain situational awareness and provide briefings through the NSR
- Activate a CCT
- Continue to update CASP
- Deploy NEMA LO to SDCC

RECOMMENDATIONS

- NEMA to hold National Coordination Meeting (NCM)
- Aus Gov agencies pre-position assets and resources where appropriate

END STATE PLANNING

DATE: 1 February 2024

PLANNING PERIOD: 4 days (to 5 February 2024)

STRATEGIC INTENT STATEMENT:

To identify potential Australian Government response options to support Queensland in the response and early relief efforts to TC Quentin, in order to minimise impacts and prevent further harm, up to 5 February 2024.

STRATEGIC INCIDENT PRIORITIES (IN ORDER)	CURRENT EFFECTS (DISORDER)	DESIRED EFFECTS (ACCEPTABLE ORDER)
• Protect human life • Prevent further harm and suffering • Provide essential humanitarian needs • Protect homes, businesses and critical infrastructure • Restore infrastructure • Maintain situational awareness and public trust • Maintain reputation of Australian Government	• Emergency services conducting preparedness activities including evacuation preparations • People are preparing for impact and storm surge • Emergency shelters opening • Weather deteriorating • Shelter warnings imminent • Longer terms evacuation centre preparations underway	• Appropriate resources pre-positioned and preparedness activities undertaken • Home and businesses prepared for cyclone impact • Emergency shelters operational and fit for purpose • Public messaging if effective, weather warnings are heeded and community complies • People seek shelter and are safe from immediate danger • Preparations underway for evacuation centres for displaced people
END STATE	**LINES OF EFFORT**	**SUCCESS CONDITIONS**
Working with the state and territory governments, the Australian Government supported Queensland response agencies in protecting human life. Affected people were evacuated safely and essential humanitarian needs were met. Essential services have been restored and critical infrastructure, homes, businesses were protected where possible. The Australian Government maintained situational awareness, public trust and its reputation.	• Coordinate Australian Government efforts and Requests for Assistance • Undertake preparedness activities as requested • Evacuation of those at risk • Provision of essential humanitarian needs • Restoration or provision of essential services • Provide up to date situational awareness and briefing products to government stakeholders	• All requests for Australian Government assistance are facilitated in a timely and effective manner • QLD supported in undertaking cyclone and flood preparedness activities • At risk populations evacuated in a safe and timely manner • Essential humanitarian needs are met, including shelter, food and water • Power, water and telecommunications services are available • Government stakeholders kept informed and provided relevant, fit for purpose briefing products

EXAMPLE CASP ONLY

COURSES OF ACTION						
LINE OF EFFORT	**SUCCESS CONDITION**	**COURSE OF ACTION**	**RESPONSIBLE ENTITY**	**ASSUMPTIONS**	**RISKS TO SUCCESS**	**AUTHORITY**
Coordinate Australian Government efforts and Requests for Assistance	All requests for Australian Government assistance are facilitated in a timely and effective manner	• NEMA conducts NCM meetings to provide WoG situational awareness • NEMA and relevant Aus Gov agencies actions all RFA's efficiently and timely	• NEMA • Aus Gov agencies • QLD Police Service	• Relevant Aus Gov agencies attend NCM • Tasked Aus Gov agencies have capability and capacity to fulfil RFA	• Requested capability unable to be provided • Competing demand on requested capabilities/assets	• NEMA • CCT • Under auspices of COMDISPLAN
Undertake preparedness activities as requested	QLD supported to undertake cyclone and flood preparedness activities	• Disaster Relief Australia (DRA) capability on standby as potential support option	• NEMA • DRA	• DRA is available and ready to be deployed to assist	• DRA unable to deploy • QLD unable to support DRA deployment	• NEMA • QLD Police Service
Evacuation of those at risk	At risk populations evacuated in a safe and timely manner	• ADF High clearance vehicles and air lift capability identified as potential support option	• NEMA • ADF	• Early notice/RFA is received • State capacity is exceeded • Aus Gov capability is required and available	• Aus Gov capability unavailable • Evacuations routes are impacted • Refusal to evacuate	• NEMA • ADF
Provision of essential humanitarian needs	Essential humanitarian needs are met including provision of shelter, food and water and healthcare	• Re-supply of essential goods • Medical teams (AUSMAT) /supplies supported where required • Humanihut capability identified and offered as a potential support option	• NEMA • Dept. of Health • Aus Gov agencies • Industry partners	• Supplies are available • AUSMAT deployment can be facilitated • Humanihut capability is available	• Humanihut unavailable or unable to be established • Supply chains impacted and routes unable to be accessed • Medical supplies are available	• NEMA • Dept. of Health • Industry partners
Provide up to date situational awareness and briefing products to government stakeholders	Government stakeholders kept informed and provided relevant, fit for purpose briefing products	• NJCOP updated • NSR dashboards produced and distributed	• NEMA • NJCOP contributing agencies	• Input into NJCOP is fit for purpose • Dashboards contain up to date, correct, relevant information	• Information is late or not correct • Distribution is not fit for purpose	• NEMA • QLD Police Service

EXAMPLE DASHBOARD ONLY

QLD –Tropical Cyclone (TC) Quentin - RESPONSE

1 February 2024
End State Planning: 5 days

Situation



Source: bom.gov.au

- TC Quentin situated 1390km east northeast of Cairns
- At 8am today (1 February, 2024) intensified to a Severe Tropical Cyclone - Category 3.
- Expected to further strengthen and track south southwest into the Coral Sea overnight.
- Forecast to reach high end category 4 intensity in the early hours of 2 February, 2024
- Expected landfall between Cairns and Innisfail in the early evening of February 2, 2024.
- COMDISPLAN has been ACTIVATED in anticipation of any Requests for Assistance from Queensland
- QLD SDCC at STANDUP

Threat Effects

Most Likely

- Preparedness activities will be effective
- Cyclone will impact at Category 4 causing damage to property and businesses
- Power and Comms outages
- Evacuation and relief centres will be operational
- State resources and capacity not exceeded
- Probability of short-term ADF support requirements
- Ongoing road closures & some impacts on supply routes
- Flooding to continue post impact

Most Dangerous

- Impacts at high category 5
- Severe flooding post impact
- QLD capacity exceeded
- Australian Government assistance required
- Loss of life
- Major loss of housing and infrastructure
- Mass evacuations / displaced people
- Hospital system overwhelmed
- Communicable disease
- Supply route disruption
- Isolated communities
- Severe agriculture and environment impacts

Key Assumptions

- QLD have capacity to respond
- ADF will be available to provide assistance, if requested
- Forecast track and intensity will eventuate
- Current EM arrangements in place and working
- Australian Government will provide assistance (if requested) and continue to and take a pro-active role.
- Community will engage with emergency response messaging
- Resource sharing arrangements will be adequate to meet need, if required

Trigger Points of Concern

- Cyclone intensifies to a Category 5 prior to landfall
- Loss of human life
- Jurisdictions exceed their response capacity/capabilities
- Evacuation centres overwhelmed
- Community complacency and lack of response/adherence to warnings
- NED thresholds met
- More rainfall leading to flooding in both impacted and new locations
- Concurrent crisis events in the rest of the country
- Increased social unrest and unlawful activity

Big Questions

- Are there current evacuation centres open?
- What is the forecast for further/future forecast rainfall?
- Does Queensland have capacity to continue to manage the impacts and consequences, including in the event of forecast rain?
- What is the likelihood of requests for Australian Government assistance?
- Australian capacity to support national resource sharing?
- What is the likely scale of and capacity to support public health requirements (e.g. disease control and psychosocial health)?
- Capacity for critical supply chains and industries to assist in recovery?
- Are vulnerable communities getting the assistance they need?

EXAMPLE DASHBOARD ONLY

QLD –Tropical Cyclone (TC) Quentin - RESPONSE

1 February 2024
End State Planning: 5 days

Strategic Intent

NEMA conducts strategic planning analysis, on behalf of the Australian Government, to identify potential Australian Government response options to support Queensland in the response and early relief efforts to TC Quentin, in order to minimise impacts and prevent further harm, up to 5 February 2024.

Incident Priorities

- Protect human life
- Prevent further harm and suffering
- Provide essential humanitarian needs
- Restore infrastructure
- Protect homes, businesses and critical infrastructure
- Maintain situational awareness and public trust
- Maintain reputation of Australian Government



Lines of Effort

- Coordinate Australian Government efforts and Requests for Assistance
- Undertake preparedness activities as requested
- Evacuation of those at risk
- Provision of essential humanitarian needs
- Restoration or provision of essential services
- Provide up to date situational awareness and briefing products to government stakeholders

Success Conditions

- All requests for Australian Government assistance are facilitated in a timely and effective manner
- QLD supported in undertaking cyclone and flood preparedness activities
- At risk populations evacuated in a safe and timely manner
- Essential humanitarian needs are met, including shelter, food and water
- Power, water and telecommunications services are available
- Government stakeholders kept informed and provided relevant, fit for purpose briefing products

Recommendations - Aus Gov

- Maintain situational awareness and provide briefings through the NSR
- Activate a CCT
- Continue to update CASP
- Deploy NEMA LO to SDCC
- NEMA to hold National Coordination Meeting (NCM)
- Aus Gov agencies pre-position assets and resources where appropriate

End State

Working with the state and territory governments, the Australian Government supported Queensland response agencies in protecting human life. Affected people were evacuated safely and essential humanitarian needs were met. Essential services have been restored and critical infrastructure, homes, businesses were protected where possible. The Australian Government maintained situational awareness, public trust and its reputation.

Australian Government

National Emergency Management Agency